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The individual exposed to " humanis
ti
c" and
"behavioristic" literature throughout his university
schooling, whether in psychology or ed ucation, may after
each successive exposure to one particular school reflect,
" I agree with that." The inconsistency o f find ing ground
for agreement in two supposed ly different schools of
thought concerni ng th e nature of what Is meaningful In
the examination and understanding of man, eventually
will, or should, create a tension that needs to be resolved.
The debate as rivat techniques
At prese nt when the referents "behaviorism" and
"humanism" come up in discussion they are usually In the
form of the adjectives: " behavioristic" and " humanistic."
In other words, the bulk of the literature we read is not so
much concerned with the theory or philosophical bases of
these two schools of thought but rather the techniques
which claim to be derived from them. Our concentration is
on technique. For behaviorists the d iscussion might cen·
ter around the merits of programmed instruction, using
a machine versus the use o f books and teachers, or the
most appropriate techniques for classroom management.
In the humanist camp, particularly in the area of Individual
development, the discussion might center around the
relative merits of the " sensitivity
train in
g" or the "en·
counter" approach, vs. the "T·Group" approach. These
group counseling techniques are usually the method of In·
tervention preferred by humanist counselors.
With this focus on technique the issue as to who has
the most effective technology is raised. Educators and
psychologists of the behavioral persuasion usually
l
fee
that they have an advantage here. Because they are con·
tent to focus on, and attempt to measure only behavior,
they can offer fai rly conclusive evidence for the el·
s fetishistic reac·
!activeness of their work. (eg . The client'
tion either persisted or it didn' t.) Behavioris ts like to point
to the dearth of convincing studies pointing to ef·
fectiveness of group growth experiences, the main tool of
the humanists. Campbell and Dunnell (1968) and Smith
(1975) have published in the Psychological Bulletin two of
the most comprehensive and rigorous reviews. To grossly
paraphrase: Campbell and Ounnett find some changes In
behavior, but virtually no evidence which Is satisfactory to
them, regard ing the effectiveness of T-group experiences
o n managerial personnel relative to their organizational
roles; Smith reviewed studies on the outcome of sensitivity training and after culling out numerous studies
which didn't obtain measures from controls, which didn"t
use a repeated measures design, and which didn't satisfy
a minimal time duration, was able to find a group of 100
powerful studies, only seventy-eight of which detected
significant predicted changes in behavior.
Behaviorists would argue that in view of this literature
one has to work rather hard to find convincing evidence
for the effectiveness of humanistlcally orientated
techniques. ls this a problem to the humanist?
No! At this point the hu manist returns to the
definit ion of his field. Humanists right from the beginning
had, almost in anticipation, set up a defense. This defense
might be called "engulf and devour" eclecticism. The
basis of this strategy is contained In any definition of
humanist psychology one might like to review. Here Is
that provided by Cohen in Hans Eyslnck's Encyclopedia of
Psychology, 1972.
"It" (humanistic psychology) " does not deny
the validity o f any psychological work with sound

13

1

Educational Considerations, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1978], Art. 7
credentials, in theory and method. It insists,
hOwever (and this is its distinctive feature), that a
comprehensive psychology of man cannot be
delimited by particular methods (experimental or
s tatistical), any more than a cartographer can omit
oceans or mountain ranges merely because he can·
not traverse the former or scale the latter."
This definition by its breadth actually allows the in·
clusion of behaviorism:" ... does not deny the validity of
any psyohOlogical work with sound credentials."
Humanists seeming ly are not denying the validity of
focusing on overt behavior as a basis of analysis for
predicting future behavior but they are implying that there
is more to human behavior than this element alone.
The debate as phllosphical differences
Where then do the differences lie, as there are in fact
differences. and what led to this rather messy state of af·
fairs? Interestingly, the fundamental distinction between
behaviorism and humanism is philosophical and Is
revealed when one examines the problem of knowledge:
(i.e. what is knowledge?).
" Empiricism" and " rationalism" are two major OP·
posing positions in the argument concern ing the relation·
ship botween experience and the organ ization of the
mind. Hilgard and Bower (1975) makes the distinction very
nicely. To paraphrase: The British Empiricists in llne with
the positivism of Comte developed a doctrine that
knowledge was derived through sensory experience. Com·
plex ideas were constructed of simpler ideas and these In
turn cou ld further be reduced. They believed that the mind
was li ke a machine built ou t of simple components each in
an additive relationship to the next. They also believed
that ideas were connected through the action of
association or contig uity in experience.
In contrast the European rationalists, Descantes,
Leibniz and Kant argued that reason alone rather than
sense data. spiritual revelation or any other source was
the basis of knowledge. They also argued that certain
types of knowledge were a priori.
Empi ricism was very powerful in the history of the
rebellion of psychology against philosophy. In this
rebellion empirical research attempted to render obsolete
any speculations about the nature of the universe. This
tradition starts with Ebbinghaus and Thorndyke, In the
188-0's and 90' s and has continued in the 20th Century with
Pavlov, Watson and Skinner. Meditations and In·
tro
spectlons on the nature of the soul, the psyche, the
mind and so on were replaced by observations and ex·
perimen ts concerning the behavior of living organisms, In·
eluding human beings. Without this work, psychology, un·
der the influence of such as Titchener, could have
remained the asylum for philosophical meditation forever.
It Is clear that the empiricist tradition gave impetus to
this development. Empiricism's notions, particularly that
of association Ism, are fundamental to the concepts of the
"law of effect" , Guthrie's contiguity theory of learning and
classical and operant conditioning. However, rationalism
has received considerable support for the notions of a
priori knowledge from psychologists working on per·
ceptual development and depth perception (Hllgard and
Bower, t975, p. 8). Associationism is also an inadequate
principle to use when explaining the " well·formedness" o f
most speech In-puts and out-puts. Associationlsm allows
for no mechanism by which the individual can sort out a
" word salad" from a meaningful sentence.
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The debate as It is now presented is essentially be·
tween behaviorally orientated and cognitively and per·
ceptually orientated psychologists who_both utilize the
empirical approach to knowledge embodied In _the _p_res~nt
day hypothetlco-deductive model of sc1ent1f1c . on·
vestigation. Given their differences I n ph1losoph1cat
origin, it is understandable that professional quar~els OC·
cur as to the adequacy of their respective explanatoons for
behavior. Humanist psychologists, however, aren't
usually associated with cognitive or _Perc.e pti?n research,
so having rejected the commonly 1mpl1ed 1nclus1on of
behaviorism by human ism and poin ted to the
phi losophical gap between behaviorism and one of the
derivatives of rationalism, cognitive psychology, where
does this leave us in our examination of the differences
between behaviorism and humanism?
Humanist psychology and ideology
A closer look at the literature of humanistic
psychology seems to indicate that the substantive di!·
ference is actually political.
Charles Hampden-Turner' s boOk Radical Man (1970)
is probably the best researched and documented presentation of the contemporary human istic position. In Radical
Man Hampden-Turner develops three themes: a critique of
current social scientific philosophy and the research 1t
generates, his own model of man, and the application of
that model in the analysis of contemporary social set·
tings. The empiricism and pos!tlvlsm which _is so ex·
trovertedly displayed by behaviorists such as Skinner, and
the structural-functionali sm found in the sociology of
Talcott Parsons and Radcllff·Brown is seen by Hampden·
Turner as essentially conservative In lu_nction.. Man is·
examined as he is and the causes for hos cond ition d1sected. By studying man in this fashion a sanctification of
the status quo takes place, which is only a shOrt step_from
saying "this is the way ii will be" or " this 1s the way 1t has
to be". Thus for Hampden-Turner the image of man im·
plicit in the practice of science is that of an atomized,
depersonalized, determined man.
Hampden-Turner' s work was a product of the sixties.
The sixties were a well-spring for humanism and typically
Hampden-Turner provides us with an alte'!'ative _image of
man: A man with a " synthesizing capacity which turns
brain input into novel output, a man with a symbolizing
and exploring capacity, and a man who engages '". a
model of pscyho-social development such that thro~gh in·
vestment of his own "authenticity" and through risking
.
himself he achieves higher "synergy."
Unfortunately for Hampden-Turner he uses as evidence for his model o f man the effectiveness of T-Group
training, an effectiveness we have. already _seen is
somewhat doubtful. This tends to add little veracity to the
model. Also while the practice of social science in·
vcstigation does often produce a rather dismal pi_cture as
humanists like Hampden-Turner point out, this is by no
means a result of the epistemology on which it is based.
Indeed this argument is a basic weak~ess o f the humanist
position . A behaviorally oriented social scientist can ha~e
a utopian goal for man, even II Walden II Is not everyone s
idea of utopia.
The organism and behaviorism
We have observed that cognitive and perceptual
psychOlogy are the natural heirs to . rationalism while
humanist psychology is a s tep child as 11 Is m~>r~ of a pol1t·
lcal doctrine rather than a psychological 1d1sc
phne.
It now
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seems only fair to see If behaviori sm also has feet of clay.
doubt when compared with more trad itional nativlst or
II does. The problem is not philosophica
organism oriented views (Chomsky, 1959, Lenneburg,
l,
rather it concerns assumption s abo ut the subject being studied.
1969).
Herrnstein (1977) argues thal Sklnnerlan behaviorism,
in its efforts to demonstrate the control o f its techno logy
Enter the counselor
over behavior, made a number of assumptions wh ich
This state of affairs leaves the counse
l
or in an exdown .played the role o f the organism. An Implicitassumpciting position . If he desires he can freely adopt the
tion was that of equlpotentlallty, that any response and
ideology of humanism and the techn iques and methods of
reinforcer and any conditioned s timulus and unanalysis derived from bo th cognitive personality theories
conditioned stimulus can be associated equally well.
and behaviorism. Indeed Lazarus (1977) argues that even
Seligman (1970) suggests degree o f " preparedness" as an
among " behavior therapists" "only a few die-hards would
alternative concept because some responses are simp
ly
not ag ree that the stimulus-res
ponse
'learning theory'
more " natural" to the animal than others. For example,
basis of behavior therapy is passe and that a distinctly
pigeons more readily peck for food relnforcers than peck
cognitive orientation now prevails."
for shock avoidance.
The reat world of human suffering has forced
Ski nner makes a great deal out of the notion that the
clinicians together at a time when theorists are prepared
taught responses of this animal are " arbitrary." They are
to acknowledge the deficiencies in their respective
not necessari ly natural to the animal and the reinforcer is
analyses.
directly
to the response. That is, the animal
not linked
might lever-press for totally different reinforcement conMahoney (1977) observes that in the 1960's the "In- iented"
sequences- food, drink, escape, etc. However, Skinsig ht-or
therapists were frustrated because they
nerian psychologists have to specify both the range of
couldn't induce change and the behavior therapists were
dimensions of the stimulus and the response. As it turns
frustrated because of the restric tiveness of their theory
out, they do this in terms of "natural lines of fracture."
and technology.
These natur
al lines of fracture depend on the physical
The new hybrid Is the cognitive or soclal·learnlng
measures of the stimulus and response, the contrend now developing in psychotherapy. Its origins are In
tingencies of reinfo rcement (how much change In willthe thought management programs of Carneg ie (194'3
) and
produce the respo nse and at what point
stimulus
Peal (1960). Later Rotter (1954), Kelly (1955) and Bandu ra
changes In the response mode wi ll cons titute a change in
(1961 , 1973) produced academic publications. Inthe response), and the characteris tics o f the organism ii·
terestingly, Eiiis's (1962, 1975) rational·emotiv
e
therapy
sell. Commercial animal trainers Breland and Breland
gained popular support before it achieved any
(1961) were among the first to point out the contamination
professional respectability
.
of response classes by their relnforcers. Racoons. in·
In
therapy there are three primary objec tives: 1) per- ill
dulged in washing behavior with coins they had to collect
ceptual sk s, 2) performance skills and 3) associative
for rei nforcement and pigs rooted with the coins under a
skills. The client is taught to examine his environment and
similar contingency. These organisms clearly have
lo analyze his thoughts and emotions about It. He Is also
pred ispositions to c ertain behavi
oral
routines. This
taught to evaluate his associations; that Is, his ex·
challenges the notion of equlpotenti
ya
llt and in terms of
pectancies and perceived contingencies, and he Is taught
this evidence the consideration o f natur
al lines of fracture
the relationship between his c og nitions and his per·
in a response is in itself a contradiction o f the notion of ar.
formance and emotions. Goals are set and behaviors and
bitrariness.
outcomes noted and monitered by the therapi st.
Closely tied to the above argument is the Skinnerian
The counselor Is presently freed from having to label
no tion of drive. For him drive might be defi ned as a parhimself, and what has been al times something o f a
ticular ctass of classes of behavior. The covariation in
tiresome debate has been largely resolved, leavlng him
these classes and their relnforcers makes the concept
free to pursue the broadest and most effective approach
necessary even for Skinner. These drives are commonly
with his client.
referred to as hunger, thirst , sex , etc. and behaviorists
usually assume that they are few in number. As a con·
Summary
sequence, they are argued to have salience in a very wide
To the extent that humanist and cognitive
range of situations. The excessive concern with these few
psychologies
share the same philosophical base they can
primary drives has diverted attention from the reinforcing
be reconciled with behaviorism in social learning theory.
nature of a behavior performed wit hout an external reinforcer. II is interesting to note that sexual gratification is
in essence not the presence of the partner but the ex·
perience of internal gratification, a consequence o f sexuat
behaviors. The reinforcer is behavior, not an object.
If a response is self-reinforcing then it can't also be
arbitrary. Herrnestein (1977) urges that academic
psychologist studying animal behavior must look more to
ethology if they wish to have a greater understanding of
behavior' s intrinsic power to reinforce.
Every school pupil has been told that speech and
language are what make our species unique. It is interesting that It is in thi s specific behavior that Skinner's
operant model experiences Its greatest problems of
prediction and has had its plauslblllty come into most
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Growth of Knowledge
The growth of knowledge might be l ikened to an expanding
balloon, with the volume of ai r inside the balloon representing the
known and the skin of the balloon marking the boundary between the
known and the unknown. As the volume of the known increases, so
does the surface area of the balloon-the extent of the boundary be·
tween the known and unknown-so that the more we see, the more
we see there is to see.
John Gribbin in
White Holes, Cosmic Gushers
In t he Universe p. 4.
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